

Measuring Consumer Sensitivity to Audio Advertising: A Field Experiment on Pandora Internet Radio

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March 20, 2017

Abstract

A randomized experiment with almost 35 million Pandora listeners enables us to measure the sensitivity of consumers to advertising, also known as the demand curve for Pandora ad-supported listening. The experiment randomized listeners into nine treatment groups, each of which received a different level of audio advertising interrupting their music listening, with the highest treatment group receiving more than twice as many ads as the lowest treatment group. By keeping consistent treatment assignment for 21 months, we can see that the long-term effects of a change in “ad load,” or number of ads per hour, take over a year to be fully realized. We estimate a demand curve that is strikingly linear, with the number of hours listened decreasing linearly in the number of ads per hour. We also show the negative impact on the number of days listened and on the probability of listening at all in the final month. Using an experimental design that separately varies the number of commercial interruptions per hour and the number of ads per commercial interruption, we find that neither makes any difference to listeners except for the way they increase the total number of ads per hour. Lastly, we find increased ad load causes a significant increase in the number of paid ad-free subscriptions to Pandora, particularly among older listeners.

1 Introduction

In the Internet era, two-sided markets have taken on considerable importance, and are critical to the business models and roles of companies as diverse as eBay, Match.com and Uber. Free, advertising-supported content is a particularly large and interesting class of two-sided markets (Rysman (2009)), including websites as diverse as Yahoo, Google, Facebook, YouTube, CNN.com, and a variety of other online news and entertainment sites. Platforms producing ad-supported content, like other two-sided markets, involve some amount of tradeoff between the goals of advertisers on one side and consumers on the other. In particular, consumers usually find it distracting or annoying to have their content consumption interrupted by advertising, but this is the price they pay for the consumption of their free content. In this paper, by varying the number of ads in a long-term randomized experiment, we measure the demand curve for free ad-supported music listening on Pandora, the world’s largest Internet radio service.¹

Pandora launched its Internet radio service in 2005, and as of 2016 it operates in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The service began with the Music Genome Project, which classifies each song on hundreds of musicological attributes in order to assess similarity between songs. A listener can specify a song, artist, album, or genre that she likes, and the Pandora service uses that information to create a station recommending similar music for that listener. The listener can further personalize her station by clicking

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We wish to recognize Chris Irwin and Jack Krawczyk for their leadership and vision in getting this experiment implemented. We thank Neil Buckman, Alexa Maturana-Lowe, Isaac Hill, Ashley Bischoff, Carson Forter, and Puya Vahabi for considerable help in producing and organizing the data. We also thank Michael Hochster, David Hardtke, Adam McCloskey, Andrew Asman, Sam Lendle, Zhen Zhu, Randall Lewis, and Jura Liaukonyte for helpful comments.

¹Because Pandora also pays royalties to musicians and promotes their music to listeners, we might actually consider its platform to be a three-sided market. But in this paper, we focus mainly on listeners and advertisers rather than the music industry.

thumbs-up or thumbs-down feedback on each song. Pandora algorithms use this thumb data, with over 50 billion thumbs recorded to date, to supplement the Music Genome, recommending music that has been liked by listeners with similar tastes. A team of scientists at Pandora has for years been developing and improving the recommendation algorithms. More recently, Pandora has also started hiring scientists to improve the advertising side of the business, and this paper is an example of the work of the ad science team.

Like many other online content services, Pandora earns its income primarily through advertising. Digital display ads are shown to listeners on the Pandora website; new ads appear only when a listener interacts with the site. In 2008, Pandora also developed a smartphone app to deliver music on mobile devices. Since smartphones have very little screen space on which to display graphical ads, and since listeners typically spend most of their listening time not looking at the website or the mobile app, in December 2008 Pandora introduced audio ads. Audio ads command attention by interrupting the music, just as they do in traditional broadcast radio, though the digital world offers much more scope for the targeting of ads based on listener characteristics. When an audio ad runs on Pandora, if the listener is looking at the Pandora app or website during the ad, she will see a companion display ad tile on the screen. If she looks at the screen after the audio ad has ended, she will see a follow-on display ad for the most recent audio ad. Both of these companion graphics are clickable, just like standard online display advertisements. While Pandora separately sells both display and video advertising ad campaigns for both web and mobile devices, today audio advertising represents the majority of Pandora’s advertising revenue.

As of 2016, Pandora has approximately 80 million monthly active listeners, each listening an average of about 20 hours per month. More than 80% of listening now takes place on mobile devices. The remainder takes place on the website as well as on other consumer-electronics devices such as Roku, AppleTV, Sonos speakers, and automobile stereo systems. Given engineering resource constraints, we chose to focus on mobile listening in our experiment. In other words, while our experiment generates variation in the quantity of advertising delivered to each listener, these deliberate differences take place only in the 80% of listening that takes place on mobile devices. Listeners in different treatment groups receive the same advertising treatment when listening on the website or on other consumer-electronics devices; their treatment differs only for the listening that takes place via iOS and Android apps.

This ambitious experiment generates a very precise estimate of Pandora listeners’ sensitivity to advertising. By varying the number of ads each listener receives, we measure the long-run effects of advertising intensity on a variety of outcomes, most notably the total quantity of hours of listening demanded by Pandora listeners. Because we experiment with nine different levels of advertising, we are able to measure a continuous demand curve, and show that it is strikingly linear over a range that involves doubling the total quantity of audio advertising on mobile devices.

Typical estimates of demand curves, using observational data, rely on untestable assumptions involving instrumental variables: for example, that some cost-shifting variable X is correlated with supply-based price changes but not with shifts in the demand curve. Experiments allow us to avoid having to make such untestable assumptions in order to identify the causal estimates of price; the randomized experiment guarantees that the effects we measure are true causal effects rather than spurious correlation.²

Nevertheless, field-experimental measurements of demand curves are still extremely rare. Amazon experimented with randomized prices to customers in 2000-2001, but the experiment was not well-received by the general public. Customers compared notes online and felt it was unfair that they were receiving different prices from each other. CEO Jeff Bezos publicly stated that it was a “mistake because it created uncertainty for customers rather than simplifying their lives.” (PSBJ (2000)) The company announced that if it ever again tested differential pricing, it would subsequently give all buyers the lowest price tested. We are not

²A particularly good example of an observational study is the recent paper of Cohen et al. (2016), who use a regression-discontinuity analysis to estimate the demand curve for Uber based on discrete changes in “surge pricing.” Because the authors are able to observe a continuous scarcity state variable that leads to discrete changes in price, they are able to argue that comparisons above and below each price-change threshold are as good as an experiment. This argument would be incorrect if consumers and drivers were somehow gaming their behavior to act differently just above a threshold than they do just below a threshold, which seems unlikely. A stronger concern about their study is how representative their results may be, since high surge prices in their study apply mainly to those who travel late at night or during morning rush hour, and these demand elasticities might not be representative of all Uber riders. Finally, because they exploit variation at the level of an individual ride, they are measuring a short-run elasticity, which might well be smaller than the long-run elasticity that would result if a treatment consumer received consistently high prices and got used to Uber being relatively expensive versus other transit options. Our experiment scores well on both representativeness and on measuring the relevant long-run demand elasticity, because we apply experimental variation in prices to all Pandora listeners over a long period of time.

aware of any reports of Amazon ever resuming this type of randomized pricing across individuals, but we have (as individual consumers) noticed seemingly random changes in Amazon prices over time. Perhaps due in part to this bad public-relations outcome of the Amazon experiment, most firms have been reluctant to run price experiments to estimate demand. Pandora’s decision to run this experiment is an extraordinary exception to this rule.

Field experiments in development economics have often performed binary pricing tests, usually finding large effects of changing the price from zero to some positive (but subsidized) price. Examples include Miguel & Kremer (2002) on free versus \$0.30 deworming medicine, Cohen & Dupas (2007) on free versus \$0.60 mosquito nets, and Ashraf et al. (2010) on free versus positive prices for water treatment. Berry et al. (2015) advocate the use of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to estimate demand by eliciting each individual’s willingness to pay, though in their water-filtration application they find some tendency for BDM to underestimate demand relative to an experiment that varies posted prices. Lusk et al. (2010) reviews the use of BDM and other lab-in-the-field auction mechanisms to estimate demand for food products in the United States; Lusk notes privately to us via email that his repeated attempts to run pricing experiments in grocery stores have generally failed due to implementation errors by grocery personnel. A rare published example of a posted-price experiment in the developed world is that of Gneezy et al. (2012), who varied the price (from \$5 to \$15) of a souvenir photo offered to thousands of tourists at the conclusion of a boat sightseeing tour.

Perhaps most closely related to our work is the research of Hohnhold et al. (2015), who vary the quality and quantity of advertising served in Google search results, finding that increased quantity and decreased quality increase the “ads blindness” of consumers, making them less likely in the long run to click on ads. Our exercise differs from theirs in that we estimate not just the effects on consumers’ interactions with ads, but the extent to which consumers reduce their consumption of music on Pandora as a result of an increase in ad volume.

Our experiment has a number of advantages relative to other measurements of demand curves. First, we are able to run a field experiment, allowing us to avoid the untestable assumptions required to infer causal effects from observational data. Our online setting made it possible for us to implement the randomized experiment without implementation errors or compliance problems. Also, because our price is an experiential one (how many ads am I listening to?), and Pandora’s audio ad volume naturally varies across individuals for a variety of institutional reasons described below, the risks of consumers feeling unhappy about perceived differences in treatment are lower. Second, we managed to expose listeners not just to a binary treatment, but to nine different intensities of advertising, with the maximum treatment approximately twice as large as the minimum treatment. Third, we conduct the experiment for 21 months, enabling us to estimate long-run effects on listening behavior. Fourth, our sample size in the millions allows us to estimate the treatment effects with considerable precision. The results add to our scientific understanding of two-sided markets of advertising-supported media content.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the details of the experimental design and provide validation of the randomized treatment assignment. Next we present our main results on the sensitivity of listeners to advertising intensity, including outcomes of hours listened, days listened, and probability of listening at all. In section 4, we measure the increased demand for a substitute product (ad-free subscriptions) due to increased advertising load. Next we look at heterogeneous treatment effects, finding interesting differences between older and younger listeners. In section 6 we take advantage of the experimental design to look at the effect of the number of commercial interruptions. The final section concludes.

2 Experimental Design

Between June 2014 and April 2016, Pandora Internet Radio conducted a large-scale experiment to measure the sensitivity of listeners to the number of audio ads they hear interrupting their music stream. During this time period, we randomized 19% of listeners into one of ten different treatment groups: nine treatment groups each with 1% of listeners, plus a 10% control group receiving the Pandora status quo. Each treatment group received different levels of audio advertising when they listened to Pandora via their mobile devices, with an individual’s treatment kept consistent for the entire period of the experiment. New listeners joining

Pandora were assigned to treatment using the same randomization (a hashing function of user ID with a unique randomization seed not used in any other current or historical experiments at Pandora).

We implemented a 3x3 experimental design, separately varying the number of commercial interruptions per hour and the number of ads per commercial interruption. At the time the experiment began, the status quo was for listeners to receive four commercial interruptions per hour. We will often refer to each commercial interruption as a “pod” of ads. The status quo at the start of the experiment was for pods to alternate deterministically between one and two ads per interruption, for an average of 1.5 ads per pod. The experiment assigned listeners to receive either 3, 4, or 6 interruptions per hour, and to receive either 1, 1.5, or 2 ads per interruption, with each of the 9 possible combinations getting its own 1% group of listeners. We will use the following shorthand to refer to these treatments: 3x1 for three 1-ad pods per hour, 6x1.5 for six pods per hour alternating between one and two ads per pod, and so on. We note that the large 10% control group was redundant with the status-quo 4x1.5 treatment. By varying ad load in these two separate dimensions, we enable ourselves to measure whether listeners have a preference for more commercial interruptions versus longer commercial interruptions, conditional on the platform’s desired number of ads per hour.

The actual number of ads received by an individual will usually differ from the number of ads just described in our experimental design. This happens for a number of institutional reasons. First, ad delivery depends somewhat on listener behavior. For example, ads are delivered according to a given schedule, and a listener who listens to only a single song might not receive any ad at all during that listening session. Also, due to resource constraints, Pandora chose to implement the experiment only in its mobile application (Android and iOS), not on the Pandora website or on other pieces of client software, such as those in automobiles. Listening on mobile devices constituted approximately 80% of Pandora listening during this time period, so the experiment does generate considerable variation in advertising exposure to individuals, but listeners who listened only on the website from their desktop computers would receive no effective differences in treatment. The total amount of realized experimental treatment, therefore, depends on how much listening an individual does on different devices. In our analysis, we consider the impact on total listening across all devices, rather than restricting attention to listening on mobile devices, since many consumers listen via multiple devices and we would expect listener perceptions of Pandora’s value to depend on the total amount of advertising they receive during all listening sessions they do.

Second, Pandora’s ad delivery also depends on advertiser demand. Unlike in many digital advertising markets, there is no well-developed auction market for online audio advertising. Instead, all audio ads on Pandora are sold via forward contracts with advertisers. These contracts generally specify targeting attributes (such as “males aged 25-44 who live in San Diego and who are listening to punk-rock music”), as well as frequency caps that prevent the same listener from hearing the same advertisement more than a specified number of times per day or week. Given these delivery constraints, Pandora sometimes has no appropriate ad to play for a given listener on a given scheduled ad-delivery opportunity. At such moments, the ad opportunity will go unfilled and the listener will get to listen to more music instead of the scheduled advertisement. The realized “fill rate” (fraction of Pandora ad-delivery opportunities that actually get filled with an ad) can vary with listener attributes, with the time of day, and with the time of year.

Thus, we observe a considerable difference between the intended ad load and the realized ad load for each listener, with the latter being what we expect to affect listener behavior. In our analysis, we therefore use instrumental-variables estimation, as treatment assignment causes plenty of exogenous variation in realized ad load, amidst other potentially endogenous variation.

We consider several different outcome measures in this experiment. Listeners may react to the increased “price” of additional audio advertising by reducing their listening in one of several ways. We consider total hours listened, number of days active in a given month, and probability of listening at all to Pandora during a given time period. Finally, we measure the impact on the probability of purchasing an ad-free subscription to Pandora, which represents a substitute (costing approximately \$5 per month) for the ad-supported version of the music service. For confidentiality reasons, we have normalized the listening hours and days metrics by dividing all observations by the control-group mean and multiplying by 100. We remind the reader of the normalization with the abbreviation “norm.” in our tables of results.

We next validate our randomized experiment by verifying that treatment assignment is uncorrelated with other variables of interest. In particular, we compute means of the outcome variables during the pretreatment period, which we define as the week just before the experiment began to ramp listeners’ intended ad loads to

Table 1: Pretreatment Period Summary Statistics (Means and Standard Errors)

	Control	Lowest Ad Load	Highest Ad Load
Total Hours (norm.)	100.000 (0.067)	100.209 (0.211)	99.919 (0.211)
Days Active (norm.)	100.000 (0.030)	100.207 (0.096)	99.963 (0.096)
Audio Ads per Hour	4.606 (0.001)	4.611 (0.004)	4.612 (0.004)
Audio Ads per Pod	1.121 (0.000)	1.122 (0.001)	1.121 (0.001)
Audio Ad Pods per Hour	3.568 (0.001)	3.573 (0.004)	3.575 (0.004)
Percent Paid Users	0.133 (0.002)	0.122 (0.005)	0.142 (0.006)
Percent Male	45.310 (0.024)	45.239 (0.075)	45.222 (0.074)
Sample Size	4,468,930	446,142	446,590

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

the desired levels. Table 1 displays comparisons of the outcome variables for the two treatment groups with the highest (6x2) and lowest (3x1) ad loads, showing that the variables are fairly similar across treatment groups. We next perform a χ^2 test for the equality of these means over all ten of the treatment groups (nine plus control, where control receives the same treatment as the 4x1.5 treatment group). As can be seen in table 2, each of these tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality at the 5% level, giving us a successful randomization check.

Table 2: χ^2 Test for Equality of Means Across All Treatment Groups, Pretreatment Period

	Test Stat.	P Value
Total Hours	6.848	0.653
Days Active	8.467	0.488
Audio Ads per Hour	11.347	0.253
Audio Ads per Pod	3.953	0.915
Audio Ad Pods per Hour	14.979	0.092

Table 3 shows the means of the amount of treatment received between June 2014 and March 2016³ for the highest and lowest treatment groups (6x2 and 3x1) compared with the control (4x1.5). We see that treatment assignment does, as intended, manipulate the realized ad load. The highest treatment group receives 37% more ads per pod and 33% more pods per hour than the lowest treatment group, for a total of 80% more ads per hour. For reference, the last row of the table shows the mean ad capacity per hour, or the number of audio ads that listeners would have received if every ad opportunity were filled by an advertiser. These numbers differ from the intended ad load numbers (6x2=12, 4x1.5=6, and 3x1=3) for several reasons having to do with the details of ad serving on Pandora. For example, listening sessions of different lengths can result in different numbers of ads per hour due to the details of the timing of ads. The most notable reason for differences is that the experiment manipulated advertising only for those listening via mobile apps, not for those listening via the Pandora website.

Figure 1 shows how the amount of treatment varies from one week to the next. This time series plot

³Technically, the experiment ended on April 7, 2016. We use the final 30 days of the experiment as our outcome period. In the remainder of this paper, we will use “final month” as shorthand for this outcome period, March 8 to April 7, 2016.




Figure 1: Realized Mean Ad Load per Hour by Treatment Group




Figure 2: Mean Final Month Ad Load by Place of Residence, Highest Intended Treatment Group

Table 3: Treatment Period Summary Statistics

	Control	Lowest Ad Load	Highest Ad Load
Audio Ads per Hour	3.916	2.968	5.383
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Audio Ads per Pod	1.253	1.077	1.453
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Audio Ad Pods per Hour	3.147	2.777	3.694
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Ad Capacity per Hour	5.479	3.719	8.443
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Sample Size	17,001,948	1,696,644	1,701,412

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$




Figure 3: Distribution of Ad Load, Highest Intended Treatment Group

shows the amount of ad-load treatment received by the highest (6x2) and lowest (3x1) treatment groups, divided by the ad load of the control group. We point out two key features. First, the experiment was designed to ramp up slowly over a period of six weeks, visible at the left side of the graph, in case listeners would find a sudden increase in ads to be jarring. Second, the amount of treatment-control difference varies somewhat over time, since realized ad load differs from intended ad load in a way that depends on advertiser demand. In particular, we can see that the treatment effect is a bit higher in December than it is in January, because advertiser demand is very high in December and relatively low in January.

While we will use the experiment to identify differences in listening behavior across treatment groups, it is interesting to note that there also exists considerable variation in ad load within each treatment group. Advertisers’ demand varies, for example, by different ages, genders, and cities of residence (DMAs). Figure 2 illustrates the variation in realized ad load across six randomly selected cities, within the highest treatment group. The overall distribution of realized treatment within this treatment group can be seen in Figure 3.

3 Measuring the Sensitivity of Listeners to Advertising

Figure 4 plots the number of hours listened each week in the highest and lowest ad-load treatments, each relative to the control group. Total hours listened diverges relatively gradually from that of the control group, with the highest ad-load treatment group gradually listening fewer and fewer hours relative to control, while the lowest ad-load group gradually listens more and more hours. Figure 5 shows that this gradual change also holds true for the number of listeners actively listening to Pandora each week. By the end of the experiment, the highest treatment group has 2% fewer active listeners than control, while the lowest treatment group has 1% more listeners than control. Most importantly, we see in both graphs of the weekly treatment effect how important it is that we ran the experiment for over a year. In both graphs, we see that the treatment effect grows over the course of an entire year, stabilizing for the most part only after 12-15 months of treatment. Table 4 shows that the treatment assignment impacted the total hours and active days in a fashion consistent with theory (i.e. users who were exposed to a higher ad load listened for fewer hours relative to the control, while those who were exposed to a lower ad load listened to more hours). We verify the difference in the outcome variables and treatment over the final month by running a χ^2 test for equality of means between all the treatment groups. Table 5 shows that we reject the null hypothesis of equality of means for all the outcome variables; the impact of experimentally varying treatment assignment is significant.

The experimental design allows us to measure the changes in listener behavior due to changes in the number of audio ads they receive. Figure 6 shows the estimated demand curve for Pandora listening in the

Table 4: Final Month Summary Statistics

	Control	Lowest Ad Load	Highest Ad Load
Total Hours (norm.)	100.000 (0.066)	101.573 (0.209)	97.221 (0.206)
Days Active (norm.)	100.000 (0.042)	101.661 (0.135)	97.421 (0.132)
Ad Capacity per Hour	5.013 (0.001)	3.335 (0.002)	8.078 (0.003)
Audio Ads per Hour	3.402 (0.001)	2.541 (0.002)	4.824 (0.003)
Audio Ads per Pod	1.219 (0.000)	1.047 (0.000)	1.433 (0.001)
Audio Ad Pods per Hour	2.770 (0.000)	2.418 (0.001)	3.303 (0.002)
Percent Paid Users	1.342 (0.003)	1.208 (0.008)	1.540 (0.009)
Percent Male	46.696 (0.012)	46.629 (0.037)	46.653 (0.037)
Sample Size	18,595,079	1,858,453	1,858,536

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 5: χ^2 Test for Equality of Means Across All Treatment Groups, Final Month

	Test Stat.	P Value
Total Hours	389.68	0
Days Active	803.03	0
Ad Capacity per Hour	3,004,959.00	0
Audio Ads per Hour	820,072.00	0
Audio Ads per Pod	1,679,016.00	0
Audio Ad Pods per Hour	448,024.00	0




Figure 4: Mean Total Hours Listened by Treatment Group




Figure 5: Mean Weekly Unique Listeners by Treatment Group

final month of the experiment, as a function of the number of ads per hour received during the previous 21 months of treatment. Each of the nine treatment groups and the control group are plotted as a single point. We can see that this demand curve is strikingly linear, much like the simplified demand curves plotted in principles-of-economics textbooks. Since none of the points deviates very much from the best-fit line, we infer that the number of pods per hour and the number of ads per pod have only second-order impacts on listening behavior, with ads per hour being the first-order explanatory variable. We will return to this question below with an explicit model.

The best-fit line displayed in Figure 6 is the result of two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimation. We use 2SLS instead of ordinary least squares (OLS) because we don't have complete control over treatment, for the variety of reasons discussed above, so that the realized ad load (number of ads per hour, aka "price") differs from what the experiment set as the intended maximum ad load. Here, the first stage regresses the realized ad load on nine treatment dummy variables, which simply estimates the mean realized ad load in each treatment group, as illustrated by the horizontal coordinates in Figure 6. The main equation (the second stage) regresses the outcome variable (hours listened in the final month) on the realized ad load, where the first stage causes us to use the mean ad load for each group (rather than the ad load for each individual) as the regressor. The first stage guarantees that we exploit only the experimental differences between groups to identify the causal effects, removing all within-group variation that might yield spurious correlation - for example, urban listeners might both receive more ads and listen fewer hours, on average, than rural listeners, even though this correlation is not at all causal. In addition to hours listened, we also consider the effects of treatment on several other outcome measures from the final month of the experiment.

Model 1 (Simple IV) Let y_i denote total listening hours or days for listener i in the final month. The regression model we run is given by:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \frac{\widehat{ads}}{hours_i} \beta_1 + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{ads}{hours_i} = TG'_i \gamma + \eta_i$$

Table 6: IV, Effect of Number of Audio Ads per Hour on Outcomes (Outcomes Normalized by Control Group Mean)

	Total Hours	Active Days
(Intercept)	108.1515*** (0.3975)	107.6380*** (0.2563)
$\frac{\widehat{ads}}{\text{hour}}$	-2.0806*** (0.0993)	-1.9444*** (0.0641)
R ²	0.0000	0.0000
Adj. R ²	0.0000	0.0000
Num. obs.	32,136,444	32,136,444

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

The 2SLS parameter estimates and standard errors are given in Table 6; we use heteroskedasticity-robust (White) standard errors when reporting all regression results in this paper. As shown in Figure 6, the number of hours listened is a linearly decreasing function of the number of ads per hour during the treatment period.⁴ The second column of the Table 6 shows that the number of days listened is similarly decreasing in the ad load (or price of listening). The slope coefficients show us that an increase in the advertising load by one audio advertisement per hour of listening results in mean listening time decreasing by $2.08\% \pm 0.19\%$, and the number of active listening days decreasing by $1.94\% \pm 0.13\%$ decrease). We note that the large size of our

⁴The linearity was quite clear in Figure 6, but we also checked the specification by adding a quadratic ad-load term or a logarithmic ad-load term to the linear term in the regression. Unsurprisingly, both specifications produced small and statistically insignificant coefficients on the nonlinear terms.

Table 7: IV, Effect of Audio Ads per Hour on Overall Listening and Listening Intensity in the Final Month (Outcomes Normalized by Control Group Mean)

	Hours	Hours/Active Day	Days/Active Listener	Last Mon. Active
(Intercept)	108.1515*** (0.3975)	101.2603*** (0.2098)	103.2546*** (0.1731)	104.0760*** (0.1734)
$\widehat{\frac{\text{ads}}{\text{hour}}}$	-2.0806*** (0.0993)	-0.3550*** (0.0575)	-0.9147*** (0.0472)	-1.0306*** (0.0440)
R ²	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Adj. R ²	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Num. obs.	32,136,444	13,157,034	13,157,034	32,136,444

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

experiment achieves considerable precision: the width of each 95% confidence interval is less than one-fifth the size of the point estimate.

Does this decrease in total listening come from shorter sessions of listening, or from a lower probability of listening at all? To answer this question, Table 7 breaks the decrease in total hours down into three components: the number of hours listened per active day, the number of active days listened per active listener, and the probability of being an active listener at all in the final month of the experiment. We have normalized each of these three variables so that the control group mean equals 100, so each of these treatment effects can be interpreted as a percentage difference from control. We find the percentage decrease in hours per active day to be approximately 0.36%, the percentage decrease in days per active listener to be 0.91%, and the percentage decrease in the probability of being an active listener in the final month to be 1.03%. These three numbers sum to 2.30%, which is approximately equal to the 2.08% percentage decline we already calculated for total hours listened.⁵ This tells us that approximately 15% of the decline in the hours in the final month is due to a decline in the hours per active day, 40% is due to a decline in the days per active listener, and 45% is due to a decline in the number of listeners active at all on Pandora in the final month. In other words, nearly half the treatment effect can be ascribed to the permanent loss of a listener, while approximately forty percent consists of a reduction in the number of days listened, and the remainder consists of reductions in the number of hours listened. We find it interesting that all three of these margins see statistically significant reductions, though the vast majority of the effect involves fewer listening sessions rather than a reduction in the number of hours per session.

3.1 Causality from Experimental Versus Observational Data

How valuable is the variation generated by this experiment? Since it can be difficult to convince decision-makers to run experiments on key economic decisions, and it consumes engineering resources to implement such an experiment properly, could we have done just as well by using observational data? To investigate this question, we re-run our analysis using only the 17 million listeners in the control group, since they were untouched by the experiment in the sense that they received the default ad load. In the absence of experimental instrumental variables, we run the regression based on naturally occurring variation in ad load, such as that caused by higher advertiser demand for some listeners than others. The results are found in Table 8. We find that the endogeneity of the realized ad load (some people get more ad load due to advertiser demand, and these people happen to listen more than people with lower advertiser demand) causes us to

⁵These three outcomes - hours per active day, days per active listener, and the probability of a listener being active - can be multiplied together to produce the total hours listened. Therefore, the sum of their percentage changes should equal the percentage change for the total hours. This arises from the fact that, for small changes, the percent change in a product is approximately the sum of the percentage changes:

$$\frac{(X + \partial X)(Y + \partial Y) - XY}{XY} = \frac{\partial X}{X} + \frac{\partial Y}{Y} + \frac{\partial XY}{XY} \approx \frac{\partial X}{X} + \frac{\partial Y}{Y}$$

The small disagreement between our two reported numbers likely results from the fact that the changes in ad load are not small ones.




Figure 6: Impact of Ad Load on Final Month Hours per Listener, By Treatment Group

overestimate the true causal impact of ad load by a factor of 3. The coefficients for the analysis of the number of listening hours and the number of active days both show this endogeneity bias, if we compare Table 8 to Table 6.

Table 8: Endogenous Regression: Outcomes on Ad Load (Outcomes Normalized by Control Group Mean)

	Total Hours	Active Days
(Intercept)	125.8813*** (0.1119)	121.1300*** (0.0670)
$\frac{\text{ads}}{\text{hour}}$	-6.6023*** (0.0182)	-5.3903*** (0.0112)
R ²	0.0034	0.0055
Adj. R ²	0.0034	0.0055
Num. obs.	16,910,897	16,910,897

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

4 Increased Demand for a Substitute: Ad-Free Subscriptions

Another important effect of an increase in ad load is to cause some listeners to switch to the ad-free version of Pandora, which was called Pandora One and priced at \$4.99 per month during the period of the experiment. We measure this effect in Table 9, where the binary outcome is the listener’s subscription status on the last day of the experiment. This 2SLS regression measures how this outcome depends on ads per hour, with the additional covariate of subscription status at the beginning of the experiment. Recall that we study only the set of individuals who did at least some ad-supported listening during the experiment, so any listeners in this dataset who were subscribers at the beginning of the experiment must have allowed their subscriptions to lapse at some point during the experiment. Even for this set of individuals, we see that those who had paid subscriptions on the first day of the experiment were 33 percentage points more likely to be a subscriber at the end than those who didn’t subscribe at the beginning of the experiment. For each additional one ad

Table 9: IV, Effect of Ad Load per Hour on Listener Churn and Pandora One Subscription

	Listener Churn	Subscriber at End
(Intercept)	0.5127*** (0.0007)	0.0044*** (0.0002)
Subscriber At Start	-0.0182*** (0.0009)	0.3314*** (0.0008)
$\widehat{\frac{ads}{hour}}$	0.0038*** (0.0002)	0.0015*** (0.0000)
R ²	0.0000	0.0803
Adj. R ²	0.0000	0.0803
Num. obs.	32,136,444	32,136,444

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

per hour during the experiment, we see a 0.15 percentage point increase in the probability of being a paid subscriber at the end of the experiment. Multiplying by the subscription fee of \$5 per month, we see that Pandora picks up additional monthly subscription revenue of approximately 0.75 cents per listener for each increase of one ad per hour (minus payment-processing costs). This turns out to be considerably smaller than the effects on advertising revenue implied by the demand-curve estimates above.

It is also instructive to compare the magnitude of this result to the similar coefficient for the probability of listening at all in the final month of the experiment, in the last column of Table 7. There we see an estimated decrease of 0.42%, for each one ad per hour, in the probability of listening at all in the final month, which is nearly three times as large as the estimate for the ad-free subscription probability. In other words, for each listener converted to a subscription by increased ad load, three more listeners leave Pandora entirely.

5 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects By Age

Next we look at heterogeneous treatment effects. Pandora most commonly uses four different age categories (13-17, 18-24, 25-54, 55+) when analyzing listeners, corresponding largely to different demographic segments of interest to advertisers. We look for differences in treatment effects across age groups by allowing the coefficients in each regression to vary by age.⁶

Model 2 (Demographic IV) *Let y_i denote total listening hours or days in the final month. Let $Demo_i$ denote a vector of dummy variables corresponding to the demographic groups a given individual belongs to. The Demographic-specific regression model we run is given by:*

$$y_i = Demo_i\beta_0 + \widehat{\frac{ads}{hours_i}} \cdot Demo_i\beta_1 + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{ads}{hours} = TG_i \cdot Demo_i\gamma + \eta_i$$

Figures 7 and 8 summarize the heterogeneous treatment effects of increasing the ad load on the number of hours listened and the number of days listened in the final month. We see that the middle age groups listen more baseline hours than the oldest and youngest age groups, but the slope (the reduction in number of listening hours due to increased ad load) is quite similar across age groups.

More interesting results come from analyzing the heterogeneous treatment effects on subscription behavior, which we can see in Table 10. The first column shows that both the baseline probability and the

⁶We actually allowed the coefficients to vary both by age and gender, but found that gender differences were negligible. We also allowed treatment effects to vary by city of residence, looking at the twenty largest DMAs, but found no statistically significant differences, as within-city variation appears to be large compared to between-city variation. We have chosen to report only the most interesting heterogeneous treatment effects we found, which are those by age

Table 10: IV Effect of Ad Load per Hour on Listener Churn and Pandora One Subscription by Demographics

	Listener Churn	Subscriber at End
Age: 13-17	0.6155*** (0.0045)	0.0004 (0.0004)
Age: 18-24	0.5445*** (0.0016)	0.0019*** (0.0003)
Age: 25-54	0.4869*** (0.0009)	0.0052*** (0.0002)
Age: 55+	0.5231*** (0.0031)	0.0079*** (0.0008)
Age: 13-17 $\cdot \widehat{\frac{\text{ads}}{\text{hour}}}$	0.0040 (0.0023)	0.0006** (0.0002)
Age: 18-24 $\cdot \widehat{\frac{\text{ads}}{\text{hour}}}$	0.0040*** (0.0004)	0.0008*** (0.0001)
Age: 25-54 $\cdot \widehat{\frac{\text{ads}}{\text{hour}}}$	0.0038*** (0.0002)	0.0016*** (0.0000)
Age: 55+ $\cdot \widehat{\frac{\text{ads}}{\text{hour}}}$	0.0028** (0.0010)	0.0023*** (0.0003)
Subscriber At Start	-0.0037*** (0.0009)	0.3297*** (0.0008)
R ²	0.0049	0.0815
Adj. R ²	0.0049	0.0815
Num. obs.	32,136,444	32,136,444

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$




Figure 7: Impact of Ad Load on Final Month Hours per Listener, by Age Groups




Figure 8: Impact of Ad Load on Final Month Active Days per Listener, by Age Groups

marginal change in probability of holding an ad-free subscription at the end of the experiment are monotonically increasing in age. As before, we include subscription status at the beginning of the experiment as a covariate. We see that listeners over 55 years old are three times as likely as listeners between the ages of 18 and 24 (marginal impact of 0.23% versus 0.08% or less) to react to an increase in ad load by paying for the ad-free service. To the extent that older people have more disposable income, these results are consistent with a positive income elasticity of demand for the ad-free subscription.

For comparison, in the second column of Table 10 we provide a related set of heterogeneous treatment effects, this time for the probability of leaving Pandora altogether. Pandora generally considers itself to have lost a listener (or the listener has “churned” away from the service) if that person has not listened to the service for two months. We therefore define a binary outcome variable equal to 1 if the listener did not listen at all during the last two months of the experiment. This time the treatment effects are monotonically decreasing in age, with less heterogeneity than in the subscription results. The youngest two age groups have coefficients of 0.40%, while the oldest age group has a coefficient of 0.28% for the measured increase in the probability of leaving Pandora for each additional ad per hour. Comparing the two columns of Table 10 shows us that the youngest listeners are far more likely to react to increased ad load by leaving Pandora than by paying for an ad-free subscription (0.40% versus 0.06% for each additional ad per hour). By contrast, listeners over 55 years old are nearly as likely to react by switching to an ad-free subscription as by leaving Pandora altogether (0.23% versus 0.28% for each additional ad per hour).

6 The Effect of the Number of Commercial Interruptions

How do consumers react to the number of commercial interruptions, as opposed to merely the number of ads? Recall that the experimental design separately varied two different components of the ad load: the number of pods per hour and the number of ads per pod. Earlier, we noted that the main impact on listening comes through their product, the total number of ads per hour. To see how the number of commercial interruptions matters independently, we add pods per hour as a covariate in our main outcome regressions, with results shown in Table 11.

Model 3 (Ads per Pod vs. Pods per Hour Model) Let y_i denote total listening hours and days in the

Table 11: IV, Effect of the Number of Commercial Interruptions, Controlling for the Number of Ads Per Hour (Outcomes Normalized by Control Group Mean)

	Total Hours	Active Days
(Intercept)	108.0645*** (0.5894)	107.1715*** (0.3802)
$\widehat{\frac{\text{pods}}{\text{hour}}}$	0.0507 (0.2536)	0.2716 (0.1637)
$\widehat{\frac{\text{ads}}{\text{hour}}}$	-2.0992*** (0.1358)	-2.0438*** (0.0877)
R ²	0.0000	0.0000
Adj. R ²	0.0000	0.0000
Num. obs.	32,136,444	32,136,444

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

final month for listener i . The regression model we run is given by:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \frac{\widehat{\text{ads}}}{\text{hours}_i} \beta_1 + \frac{\widehat{\text{pods}}}{\text{hours}_i} \beta_2 + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

$$\frac{\text{ads}}{\text{hours}_i} = TG'_i \gamma_1 + \eta_{1,i}$$

$$\frac{\text{pods}}{\text{hours}_i} = TG'_i \gamma_2 + \eta_{2,i}$$

We find no evidence to suggest that redistributing advertising across more interruptions, conditional on the number of ads per hour being held constant, has any impact on customers' propensity to listen to Pandora. Both key listening outcomes (total hours and number of active days) show a small and statistically insignificant impact of pods per hour, with coefficients of $0.05\% \pm 0.51\%$ and $0.27\% \pm 0.33\%$, respectively. We conclude that the number of commercial interruptions has no explanatory power for listening behavior once we take into account the number of ads per hour. In other words, what really matters to listeners is the total number of ads per hour, not how those ads are distributed across commercial interruptions - at least for the range of values tested here (3 to 6 pods per hour).

7 Conclusion

We have reported on the results of an extensive experiment undertaken by Pandora to trace out its consumers' demand curve for Pandora listening as a function of the number of audio ads served. With more than 30 million listeners experiencing one of nine different randomized treatments consistently for a period of 21 months, we have obtained what may be the best estimate of a demand curve ever performed. We found that the quantity of hours listened is strikingly linear in the price (number of ads per hour). By contrast, the number of commercial interruptions per hour (which we varied separately from the number of ads per interruption) has little effect on listening behavior once we have controlled for the number of ads per hour. We decomposed this clear reduction in listening due to increased ad load into three components: 45% due to Pandora listeners stopping their listening entirely, 40% due to active Pandora listeners listening fewer days during the month, and 15% due to listeners listening fewer hours on each day they choose to listen.

Our experiment measured the impact of the experienced quantity of advertising on listening behavior. While this gives us a very relevant demand curve, it is different from the exercise of announcing a new "price" (or advertising quantity) publicly and having it be consistent across consumers. To some people, the latter might seem a better example of what one usually means by a price change. However, giving everyone the same treatment would destroy our ability to measure the effects with a controlled experiment. We demonstrate the importance of using an experiment rather than relying on endogenous observational data,

as a regression relying only on naturally occurring variation in ad load within the control group produces an estimate three times as large as the truth we obtain with our experiment.⁷

In addition to measuring the downward-sloping demand curve for Pandora ad-supported listening, we also measured the related increase in demand for a substitute: Pandora ad-free subscriptions. The impact on incremental ad-free subscriptions was highly significant, and monotonically increasing in the age of the consumer. The incremental probability of leaving Pandora entirely due to increased ad load is monotonically decreasing in age. These two effects combine so that for the oldest consumers, the incremental probability of switching to an ad-free paid subscription is almost as large as the incremental probability of leaving Pandora altogether.

Our estimates are quite precise, with the slope coefficients in our main outcome regressions having t -statistics of approximately 20 (i.e., point estimates five times larger than the width of their 95% confidence intervals). We also saw that the effects of a change in ad load take at least a year to be fully realized, demonstrating the importance of our having run a long-term experiment. These results go a long way towards helping us understand the science of two-sided markets, as we have managed to describe the behavior of one side of Pandora’s advertising business in great detail. To more fully understand the demand for the platform from the advertiser’s perspective, we would need to conduct a similar pricing experiment with advertisers. We have begun to contemplate how to run such an experiment, but the experimental design will be much harder, given that the number of advertisers is several orders of magnitude smaller than the number of listeners, and that advertising sales generally take place via bilateral negotiations.

The results are also quite relevant to Pandora’s business, as the firm has gained a much better understanding of its listeners through this experiment. Prior to the experiment, Pandora had almost no data on how sensitive its ad-supported listeners were to the level of advertising. Armed with the demand-curve estimates presented here, the company has much better information for deciding appropriate levels of advertising for its audience. The results on heterogeneous treatment effects by age are also quite valuable for understanding the behavior of listeners. Though such experiments have not been common in the past, we hope that firms will conduct more such important experiments in future.

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⁷Note that one potential source of bias in our experiment is word-of-mouth effects. If some listeners stop listening to Pandora because they talk to friends who complain about how many ads they hear on Pandora, then this would cause spillovers between treatment and control, and thereby cause us to underestimate the true causal effects of ad load. We believe such a spillover effect to be negligible on the existing Pandora listeners we study, but we acknowledge the possibility that spillover effects could cause us to estimate consumers to be less sensitive to ad load than they really are.

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